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Introduction 
According to one influential view in metaethics (e.g. Harman 1977, Boyd 1988), 
we are justified in believing in ethical facts just in case they (or their reduction base) feature 
in our best explanations of scientifically respectable phenomena. This naturalistic criterion, 
however, can seem to miss a crucial point. Many of us care about the existence of ethical 
facts not because of scientific-explanatory roles that they may play, but rather because we 
seemingly need such facts to make adequate sense of our practical lives. This suggests a 
Tempting Idea: that the (putative) indispensability of belief in ethical facts for our practical 
projects – including, for example, the project of deliberating about what to do – can justify 
our belief in such facts. Some version of this idea has attracted a range of philosophers, 
including Christine Korsgaard (1996), Ronald Dworkin (2011), and T. M. Scanlon (2014).  
Any philosopher hoping to develop the Tempting Idea needs to answer two 
questions. First: which beliefs are relevantly indispensable? And second: what is the 
significance of this indispensability? David Enoch has recently spelled out a powerful and 	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novel version of the Tempting Idea, which he develops primarily in “An Outline of an 
Argument for Robust Metanormative Realism” (2007) and Chapter Three of his Taking 
Morality Seriously (2011b). Enoch’s account offers ambitious answers to each of these 
questions.  
In response to the first question, Enoch argues for the indispensability of belief in 
what he calls Robust Realism about ethical facts.1 According to Robust Realism, ethical facts 
are ungrounded, irreducibly normative, and psychology-independent. Further, Enoch 
claims that Robust Realism is incompatible with a quietist or quasi-realist interpretation of 
these metaphysical claims. Enoch argues that such belief is indispensable to the project of 
practical deliberation: the project that we engage in when we seek to choose what to do 
(2011b, 70-73). This idea is intensely controversial and well worth examining. However, 
in this paper we set it aside, in order to focus on Enoch’s answer to the second question.  
In response to the second question, Enoch argues that deliberative indispensability 
is significant because such indispensability can epistemically justify belief. More precisely, 
Enoch defends:  
Indispensabilism  If a belief-forming method is indispensable to the project of 
practical deliberation, then that method is a source of basic 
epistemic justification 
For someone hoping to develop the Tempting Idea into a response to the naturalistic 
epistemic criterion mentioned at the beginning of this paper, Indispensabilism has three 
striking virtues. First, it claims to underwrite epistemic justification (the Tempting Idea itself 
is silent on the type of justification provided). If defensible, it thus constitutes a direct 
rebuttal to the naturalistic criterion. Absent this claim, a defense of the Tempting Idea 
threatens to suggest that our capacity for practical deliberation dooms us – either causally 
or rationally – to epistemic irrationality. Second, Indispensabilism promises to ameliorate a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  Three clarificatory notes. First, strictly speaking, Enoch takes certain belief-forming methods to be 
indispensable. In calling belief in Robust Realism ‘indispensable’ here, we signal that, according to Enoch, it 
follows from the proper deployment of an indispensable method. We explain this part of Enoch’s reasoning 
in more detail below (in §1). Second, we treat facts as the standard metaphysical relata throughout, while 
Enoch typically talks of truths. We take this change to be unobjectionable given Enoch’s commitments, a 
point that he himself emphasizes (2011b, 5). Third, we talk of ethical facts, where Enoch tends to talk of 
normative facts. We mean ‘ethical’ here broadly, to refer to the normative and evaluative facts that govern our 
practical lives. We insist on this change in wording because epistemic facts are also normative, and because 
the contrast between ethical and epistemic normativity is central to our project here.     
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standard worry about metaethical views that violate the naturalistic criterion: that they are 
forced to posit a special capacity to directly perceive non-natural ethical facts. A proponent 
of Indispensabilism can argue that our justification for belief in such facts is explained by the 
deliberative indispensability of such belief, rather than by a mythical perceptual capacity. A 
third virtue of Indispensabilism is its neutrality concerning the nature and grounds of 
ethical facts. One might try to defend the Tempting Idea in part by arguing that facts about 
indispensability explain the fundamental ethical facts. By contrast with this approach, if 
Indispensabilism could be defended, it might be adapted to permit proponents of a variety 
of metaethical views to vindicate the Tempting Idea.  
For these reasons, we take Indispensabilism to be an important thesis. However, in 
this paper, we argue that Indispensabilism should be rejected. The core reason is this: 
Indispensabilism conflicts with part of what is distinctive of epistemic justification.  
The distinctiveness of epistemic justification can be suggested by the following 
thought experiment. Suppose that Hallie believes that when she sings “Don’t Stop Believin’” 
in the shower, she sounds exactly like Journey’s Steve Perry. This belief is strikingly 
irrational: merely attending carefully to the sound of her own voice would suffice to 
disabuse her of this belief, and her trustworthy friends have let her know how silly her 
belief is. Now suppose that an evil demon lets Hallie know that if she ceases to hold this 
belief, the demon will brutally torture every sentient being that exists. This fact gives 
Hallie very strong practical reasons to retain her belief, but evidently does nothing to 
epistemically justify her belief.	  The case of Hallie dramatizes the familiar point that ethical 
and epistemic normativity appear to be very different things, by showing that one can have 
overwhelming ethical justification for a belief, while lacking any epistemic justification for 
it.2 
 This stark contrast helps to frame our thesis. At best, the fact that something is 
deliberatively indispensable can perhaps provide ethical reasons for belief. However, it is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 There might be other ways of drawing the distinction between Hallie’s different reasons that would work 
for our argumentative purposes in this paper. Our point is that however one draws this distinction, the case 
of Hallie brings out an intuitive and important contrast between two different sets of norms that an agent can 
be subject to. We are characterizing one set of these norms as the norms of genuine epistemic justification, and 
we submit that it is deeply intuitive that only one set of these norms can plausibly be understood this way. 
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not the right sort of thing to underwrite epistemic justification. Thus, Indispensabilism must 
be rejected.  
Our paper proceeds as follows. We start by laying out our exemplary stalking 
horse: Enoch’s case for Indispensabilism (§1). We then argue that Enoch’s case fails 
because it elides a distinctive feature of genuinely epistemic justification, a feature that we 
dub Truth-Directedness (§2). Briefly, according to Truth-Directedness, the norms of 
epistemic justification have the content they do because of some positive connection to the 
truth of the beliefs these norms govern. (We give a more precise characterization of this 
thesis in §2). Because Enoch’s account fails to respect a crucial part of what is distinctive 
about epistemic justification, it thereby fails as a defense of Indispensabilism (which, recall, 
is a thesis about epistemic justification). Enoch’s specific proposal, however, is just one 
possible attempt to defend Indispensabilism. We go on to argue that our objection 
generalizes to a range of salient alternatives to Enoch’s way of defending Indispensabilism. 
These alternatives are based on leading general approaches in contemporary epistemology. 
We argue that looking at these alternative defenses of Indispensabilism reveals a general 
tension between Truth-Directedness and Indispensabilism (and not just Enoch’s particular 
defense of it). We thus conclude that deliberative indispensability does not epistemically 
justify belief (§3). Although our main argument in this paper is directed at Indispensabilism, 
part of our goal here is to get clearer on what it would take to defend the initial Tempting 
Idea, and to assess the prospects for doing so. We thus examine three ways of attempting 
to salvage the Tempting Idea, in the face of our argument. We briefly argue that each of 
these attempts faces significant costs. In light of this, we suggest that pessimism is 
warranted about the Tempting Idea itself (§4). We conclude the paper with brief 
reflections on the broader metaethical significance of our arguments (§5).   
 
1. Enoch’s defense of Indispensabilism 
 In this section and the next, we aim to illustrate the promise and perils of 
Indispensabilism by exploring its powerful recent defense by David Enoch. In this section, 
we first explain the role of that defense in Enoch’s case for his Robust Realism about ethical 
facts. This illuminates part of the potential metaethical significance of Indispensabilism. We 
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then lay out the details of Enoch’s case for Indispensabilism, which puts us in a position to 
evaluate it in the following section.  
  
1.1 From deliberative indispensability to Robust Realism 
 To understand any indispensability argument, one must understand the notion of 
indispensability being deployed. We thus begin by unpacking two technical notions that 
Enoch introduces: an intrinsically indispensable project, and something’s being instrumentally 
indispensable to such a project. We then introduce the outline of Enoch’s ambitious 
deliberative indispensability argument for Robust Realism about ethical facts. 
On Enoch’s account, a project is intrinsically indispensable if it is “rationally non-
optional”, such that disengaging from it “is not a rationally acceptable option” (2011b, 70).3 
This entails that one is rationally criticizeable if one does disengage from such a project. It 
is worth emphasizing that this account is explicitly normative. A project thus does not 
count as intrinsically indispensable in Enoch’s sense simply because one is stuck with 
engaging in it (in the non-normative sense of “stuck with”).4  
There can be necessary conditions for pursuing such a project. According to Enoch, 
for something to be instrumentally indispensable to a project is for its elimination to 
undermine or attenuate the reasons that we had for engaging in that project in the first 
place. Crucially, Enoch wants to distinguish such instrumentally indispensable features 
from mere “enabling conditions” for a project. For example, take the relationship between 
getting adequate sleep and the project of engaging in scientific enquiry. Enoch claims that 
while getting enough sleep might be an enabling condition for this project, it is not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 While some philosophers (e.g. Broome 1999 and Kolodny 2005) use “rationality” to talk about distinctively 
structural normativity, Enoch uses “rationality” here as a way to talk about substantive normative facts.  
4 On this point, Enoch 2011b differs from his 2007 presentation of his indispensability argument. This change 
makes Enoch’s metaethical views more consistent: as he himself notes, the earlier version of his argument 
faces his own “schmagency” challenge to attempts to explain authoritative normativity in terms of necessary 
facts about agency (Enoch 2006). The change also allows Enoch to avoid intuitive worries that afflict his 
earlier argument. For example, we can imagine possible creatures who are doomed to engage in worthless 
projects – perhaps because they were designed to be doomed in this way. It is especially hard to see why 
serving such a project could epistemically justify otherwise unsupported beliefs. For these reasons, we take 
Enoch’s explicitly normative gloss on intrinsic indispensability in his 2011b to be a significant improvement 
on the original 2007 version. 
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instrumentally indispensable to this project, in the sense of “instrumentally indispensable” 
that he has in mind (2011b, 68). 
With these clarifications in hand, we can now present a schematic form of Enoch’s 
overall indispensability argument:5  
1. If (implicitly or explicitly) treating a belief-forming method as a source of 
basic epistemic justification is instrumentally indispensable to an 
intrinsically indispensable project, then that method is a source of basic 
epistemic justification (2011b, 60-64).  
2. The project of practical deliberation is intrinsically indispensable (2011b, 
70-73). 
3. Treating our commitments in practical deliberation as a source of basic 
epistemic justification is instrumentally indispensable to the deliberative 
project (cf. 2011b, 67-69). 
4. Therefore, our commitments in practical deliberation are a source of basic 
epistemic justification. (from premises 1-3)  
5. In practical deliberation, we are committed to belief in the existence of 
ethical facts, as they are conceived of by Robust Realism (2011b, 71-79). 
6. Therefore, (because sources of basic epistemic justification provide 
defeasible epistemic justification) we have defeasible epistemic justification 
for believing in the existence of Robustly Real ethical facts. (from 
premises 4-5) 
Premises (1) and (2) of this argument entail (a variant of) Indispensabilism. The remainder 
of the argument shows that, together with the further claims about practical deliberation in 
premises (3) and (5), Indispensabilism can support an ambitious metaethical view: namely, 
Robust Realism about ethical facts. Note that at various points in this paper, we will 
abbreviate the sort of case just sketched for (6) – and theses like it – by saying that, 
according to Enoch, deliberative indispensability provides basic justification for believing that P. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Enoch provides a simpler schematic summary of his argument (2011b, 83). However, because that 
reconstruction elides detail in his argument that is crucial to our discussion here, we have provided our own, 
slightly more complex summary here.  
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 This argument illustrates the potential metaethical significance of Indispensabilism, 
and also illustrates why it is such a powerful way of developing the Tempting Idea that we 
introduced at the start of this paper. Enoch appears to offer a clear and principled account 
of how epistemically justified belief in non-natural ethical facts is possible, and, moreover, 
do so in a way that also provides a kind of positive argument for Robust Realism in 
metaethics. It is a positive argument for Robust Realism (a metaphysical thesis) for the 
following straightforward reason: it is telling you that you have epistemic reason to believe 
this metaphysical thesis.  
We have significant worries about premises (2), (3), and (5) of the argument.6 
However, the metaethical bite of Indispensabilism extends beyond Enoch’s own defense of 
this thesis. This is because the basic Indispensabilist idea could potentially be combined 
with a variety of auxiliary commitments (in lieu of premises (2-5)), to epistemically justify 
various commitments in or about ethics. The epistemic heart of Enoch’s argument that 
achieves these results is premise (1). In the next subsection, we thus explore Enoch’s case 
for this premise in detail. 
 
1.2. Enoch’s strategy for vindicating Indispensabilism 
Enoch’s defense of Indispensabilism presupposes a specific kind of foundationalist 
picture of the structure of epistemic justification. On this picture, certain belief-forming 
methods are epistemically derivative while others are epistemically basic. Consider an example 
of an epistemically derivative method: someone might be justified in using the results of a 
DNA test as evidence of paternity, but only because she has prior evidence of the reliability 
of the test. By contrast, consider belief-forming methods such as reliance on sense-
perception and memory, inference to the best explanation, and inference rules like modus 
ponens. Enoch claims that these methods are epistemically basic: using these methods can 
produce defeasibly epistemically justified belief, even when we lack independent epistemic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Here are two examples. First, Premise (3) is challenged by the existence of credible anti-intuitionist 
approaches to moral epistemology. Second, with premises (2) and (5), Enoch faces a version of a dilemma he 
himself has pressed against the constitutivist: the more you build into a conception of practical deliberation, 
the less plausible it is that doing that is rationally non-optional (2011b, 71-2). We find it especially doubtful 
that belief in the existence of ethical facts, as conceived of by Robust Realism is deliberatively indispensable. 
For related challenges, see (Husi 2013, §4), (Lenman, 2014), and (Björnsson and Olider, forthcoming).  
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justification for using them (Enoch 2011b, 58; cf. Enoch and Schechter 2008). For 
uniformity, we will call these methods sources of basic epistemic justification.  
 Enoch argues that philosophers who endorse the foundationalist picture face the 
burden of explaining the facts in virtue of which only some belief forming methods are 
basic justifiers (Enoch 2011b, 59ff, Enoch and Schechter 2008, 547). What, we might 
demand, explains the contrast between reliance on memory and reliance on DNA testing? 
Note that this is not a request for an epistemic justification for treating certain sources as 
basic. Rather, the question is: what explains why these sources have the status of being 
epistemically basic?  
Enoch calls the sort of explanation he is after here a “vindication”. The details of 
Enoch’s own glosses on this term are not totally clear. We will understand a vindication as 
an explanation of the distinctive epistemic status of the methods that are basic sources of 
justification, where this explanation fits with (or ideally supports) the intuitive normative 
significance of these sources. This is in contrast to an explanation that debunks that 
purported significance or reforms it away (cf. 2011b, 60). One might be able to provide a 
vindication in this sense by using one of a variety of different types of philosophical 
explanation.7 We think that Enoch’s own approach to offering a vindication is best 
understood as a grounding account: a metaphysical account that explains the facts in virtue 
of which certain sources provide basic epistemic justification.8 We join Enoch in taking the 
demand for a vindication of the sources of basic epistemic justification to be forceful 
(modulo the controversial assumption of the truth of foundationalism). And we are happy 
to grant for the sake of argument that such a vindication should take the form of a 
grounding account. Our concern in this section is with the specific grounding account that 
Enoch proposes. Enoch originally developed the core of this account in joint work with 
Joshua Schechter (Schechter and Enoch 2006, §6; Enoch and Schechter 2008). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Consider two familiar alternatives. First, one might propose a vindication of the sources of basic epistemic 
justification by providing an ontological reduction of the source of basic epistemic justification relation. Second, a 
proponent of ambitious conceptual analyses (à la Jackson 1998) might propose a vindication via an analysis of 
the concept BASIC SOURCE OF JUSTIFICATION that illuminated its extension. 
8 For a helpful overview of grounding in contemporary metaphysics, see Trogdon 2013. 
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Because Enoch calls his vindicating account a “pragmatic” one, we will appropriate 
this handy (if slightly misleading) label to refer to his account. This account can be stated as 
follows: 
Pragmatic One complete ground for the fact that something is a source of 
basic epistemic justification is the fact that treating it as such a 
basic source is instrumentally indispensable to an intrinsically 
indispensable project.9 
Pragmatic trivially entails premise (1) of Enoch’s argument. And it is thus the crucial step 
in his case for Indispensabilism (we are granting him the other element of that case: the 
assumption that practical deliberation is an intrinsically indispensable project).  En route to 
assessing Pragmatic’s plausibility as a vindicating account for the sources of basic epistemic 
justification, we sketch three virtues of this thesis. 
 Pragmatic’s first virtue is that it appears to offer a credible explanation of the 
substantive normativity of the basic epistemic justification facts. What do we mean by this? 
Contrast epistemic norms with the norms of chess, or fashion. Indifference to the 
“epistemic evaluation game” seems like an objective flaw, in a way that indifference to chess 
or the norms of fashion does not: the epistemic norms appear to have normative substance 
in a way these other norms do not. 10  As we have seen, Enoch’s conception of 
indispensability appeals to ethical facts, which are themselves substantively normative. It 
thus entails that basic epistemic justification facts will be grounded partly in substantively 
normative facts. Because grounding can arguably transmit normativity, being grounded in 
substantively normative facts seems like a promising way to explain the substantive 
normativity of the epistemic justification facts. 
 Second, Enoch suggests that Pragmatic is plausible in part because it is capable of 
explaining the epistemic status of a plausible range of the sources of basic epistemic 
justification. Enoch takes inference to the best explanation (IBE) as his leading illustration. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Enoch’s clearest official statement of his thesis (2011b, 63) provides a mere sufficiency condition for being a 
source of basic epistemic justification. Enoch clearly intends the thesis to be explanatory, and our formulation 
reflects that fact. It should be noted that many important motivations for this thesis (including both 
motivations that we discuss below) would be more compelling if Pragmatic were strengthened to purport to 
explain the complete grounds of all basic sources of justification. 
10 See McPherson 2011, Sec. 4 for a brief exploration of this contrast, in terms of “formal” vs. “robust” 
normativity. 
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On Enoch’s account, IBE is a source of basic epistemic justification because (i) the project 
of understanding and explaining the world around us is rationally non-optional, and (ii) 
deploying IBE is instrumentally indispensable for creatures like us pursuing this project 
(2011b, 60-61).  
 Enoch’s focus on IBE has a further, dialectical payoff. The naturalistic criterion for 
justifying commitment to ethical facts that we introduced at the beginning of this paper 
appeals crucially to IBE. And this criterion seriously threatens Enoch’s Robust Realism, 
since, on his view, the fundamental ethical facts are irreducible and do not explain anything 
non-normative. It also threatens all arguments from deliberative indispensability, since 
deliberative indispensability does not entail explanatory indispensability.   
If we suppose that Enoch is right that Pragmatic provides the most plausible 
vindication for the epistemic status of IBE, however, the threat posed by the naturalistic 
criterion is neutralized. This is because (as Enoch argues) Pragmatic can vindicate other 
sources of basic epistemic justification besides IBE. Further, deliberative indispensability 
arguments are no longer threatened, because deliberative indispensability is claimed to 
explain the epistemic status of IBE itself.  
Enoch’s case for Pragmatic is part of a clear and carefully developed argument for 
Indispensabilism. The virtues just canvassed so far also suggest that this argument for 
Indispensabilism is substantively compelling. However, in the next section, we argue that 
despite its promising features, Enoch’s defense of Pragmatic is ultimately unsuccessful.   
 
2. Epistemic justification and truth 
 This section sets out our case against Pragmatic – Enoch’s vindicating account of 
the sources of basic epistemic justification. We begin by articulating and defending a partial 
characterization of what is distinctive of epistemic justification: that it is directed at the 
truth (§2.1). We then introduce three intuitive counterexamples to Pragmatic, and argue 
that the force of these counterexamples is well-explained by the truth-directedness of 
epistemic justification (§2.2). We argue that our theory of the truth-directed nature of 
epistemic justification, coupled with these counter-examples, gives us strong reason to 
reject Pragmatic (§2.3). 
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 A vindicating account of a phenomenon is supposed to explain and uphold our 
intuitive commitments with respect to that phenomenon, rather than debunking or 
substantially reforming them. A vindicating account of the sources of basic epistemic 
justification should thus accomplish at least the three following goals. First, it should 
explain (or at least be compatible with) the most plausible theses about which sources of 
epistemic justification are basic. Second, it should explain (or at least be compatible with) 
the apparent normative substantiveness of the norms of epistemic justification. Third, it 
should explain (or at least be compatible with) our sense of what is distinctive of the norms 
of epistemic justification.  
 In the previous subsection, we saw that Enoch makes a prima facie case that 
Pragmatic meets the first desideratum, by arguing that Pragmatic can explain the status of 
belief-forming methods like IBE. We also saw that there is a good case to be made that it 
meets the second desideratum. This is because Pragmatic grounds facts about the sources of 
basic epistemic justification partly in ethical facts. 
The third desideratum demands that a vindicating account of the sources of basic 
epistemic justification explain (or at least be compatible with) what is distinctive of 
epistemic justification. There is little in Enoch’s work that explicitly addresses the third 
desideratum. Further, recall the case of Hallie that we set out in the Introduction. As this 
case shows, epistemic and ethical justification look like radically different creatures. This 
licenses initial suspicion that an account like Pragmatic, which seeks to ground the sources 
of basic epistemic justification partly in ethical norms, will struggle to satisfy this 
desideratum. We argue that this initial suspicion is warranted: Pragmatic should be 
rejected precisely because it is incompatible with a central distinctive feature of epistemic 
justification. This is a feature that we call Truth-Directedness.  
 
2.1 Truth-Directedness 
Recall the case of Hallie and the demon. The demon will torture every sentient 
being if Hallie ceases to believe that she sounds exactly like Journey’s Steve Perry when she 
sings “Don’t Stop Believin’” in the shower. As we emphasized, this fact fails to provide 
epistemic justification for Hallie’s continuing to believe that her singing voice sounds like 
Steve Perry’s. A compelling explanation of this failure is that this fact about the 
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consequences of Hallie’s belief is wholly unconnected to the truth of the proposition that 
her singing voice sounds like Steve Perry’s. If this diagnosis is right, it suggests that any 
adequate explanation of the sources of basic epistemic justification will need to appeal in a 
central way to some link between those sources and true belief.      
We endorse a specific, although highly schematic, account of this link: 
Truth-Directedness the sources of basic epistemic justification have the 
content that they do (in part) because of some 
positive connection between those sources and the 
truth of the beliefs that they govern 
Note that, as the “(in part)” locution suggests, Truth-Directedness provides only a 
necessary condition: it is compatible with there being further conditions that a source of 
basic epistemic justification needs to satisfy. We now clarify three elements of this thesis: 
the appeal to truth, to explanation (“because”), and to positive connection.  
First, in adverting to truth, we do not intend to commit ourselves to a specific 
account of truth. To see this, note that one could restate our thesis (more clumsily) in 
terms of a positive connection between (a) belief that P and (b) P. Many philosophers with 
a range of views about truth - both substantive and minimalist - should find this thesis 
attractive. 
Second, the thesis asserts that the connection between the truth and the sources of 
basic epistemic justification must be explanatory. The thesis is thus fundamentally a 
constraint on theories that purport to explain why something is a source of basic epistemic 
justification. According to Truth-Directedness, all such theories must advert to some 
positive connection to truth as a criterion. Consider an example where this connection 
fails: a crude epistemic divine command theory. This theory states that a belief-forming 
mechanism’s being a source of basic epistemic justification is grounded in God’s 
commanding you to treat it as basic. This theory violates the explanatory requirement of 
Truth-Directedness. Note that even if God in fact ensured that the sources he commanded 
you to rely on are reliable, the link to truth thereby secured is not part of this theory’s 
account of what explains why something is a source of basic epistemic justification. We think 
that the fact that this theory violates Truth-Directedness is one sufficient explanation of 
why this theory fails as an account of epistemic justification.  
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Crucially, Truth-Directedness is a demand on the theory that explains epistemic 
basicness, not on the basic sources themselves. Truth-Directedness thus does not require 
that a source of basic epistemic justification must “have truth as a goal”. For example, 
conceptual competence with the concept AND does not obviously involve having truth as a 
goal, any more than competence with the concept TONK does. This is compatible with a 
theory of the sources of basic epistemic justification saying (for example) that our 
competence with the former, and not the latter, is a source of basic epistemic justification, 
in part because the first concept is truth-preserving while the second is not.11     
Third, Truth-Directedness requires some positive connection between the sources of 
basic epistemic justification and truth. We intend this thesis in a very ecumenical spirit. 
Thus, some epistemologists might understand the positive connection in modal terms: for 
example in terms of reliability or safety. Others might flesh it out in terms of the 
constitutive goals of epistemic agents, or in terms of conditions for responsible pursuit of 
the truth. Still others might appeal to conditions for the possibility of the pursuit of truth, 
or on pursuing the truth efficiently.  
To underscore the ecumenical spirit of our thesis, consider three more examples 
of controversial theses that Truth-Directedness is compatible with, but distinct from. First, 
some philosophers are attracted to the idea that belief “aims at the truth” in some interesting 
sense.12 If combined with the thought that the epistemic norms are the constitutive norms 
of belief, this sort of approach could be developed into an appropriately truth-directed 
grounding account of the sources of basic epistemic justification. Second, Selim Berker 
(2013) argues against a view that he calls “epistemic teleology”, which combines Truth-
Directedness with the assumption that “directedness” should be construed as a promotion 
relation, and that the goods to be promoted can be aggregated. The thesis defended here is 
compatible with either accepting or rejecting these further assumptions.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 This simple proposal is intended only as an illustration. Perhaps, as Schechter and Enoch (2006, 705) worry, 
direct appeal to truth-preservation in this example is objectionably reliabilist. That would not count against 
Truth-Directedness, because there are multiple ways of making good on Truth-Directedness that are not 
reliabilist. See §3 for discussion.  
12 For some of the different takes on how to best understand the idea that “belief aims at the truth” see 
Velleman 2000, Wedgwood 2002, Shah 2003, and Gibbard 2008. 
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Third, pragmatic encroachment about knowledge is, roughly, the view that whether a 
given body of evidence suffices to put a subject in a position to know that P can depend 
upon the practical stakes involved in the agent’s relying upon P in their practical 
deliberation. Critics of pragmatic encroachment about knowledge sometimes appeal to 
claims similar to Truth-Directedness. However, the Truth-Directedness of epistemic 
justification is compatible with the most influential defenses of pragmatic encroachment 
about knowledge (e.g. Hawthorne 2004, Stanley 2005, Fantl and McGrath 2009). 
Distinguish two issues: (1) when a token source of evidence provides (at least some) 
justification for believing that P vs. (2) the threshold of justification required for knowledge, 
or for adequately epistemically justified belief. Standard views of pragmatic encroachment 
address the second issue, but we intend Truth-Directedness to be a thesis about the first.13  
As the discussion above makes clear, Truth-Directedness is a highly schematic 
theory in the foundations of epistemology. This indeterminacy might seem objectionable, 
but it is not. Rather, it is dialectically crucial. Disputes between the sorts of approaches 
mentioned above are central to contemporary epistemology. Truth-Directedness is 
intended to be powerfully ecumenical, in virtue of being compatible with all of these 
approaches. Indeed, we take commitment to something like Truth-Directedness to be close 
to common ground in many parts of epistemology. Thus, when epistemologists seek to 
explain the foundations of epistemic justification, they often predictably advert to similar 
theses. Here is one representative example, from Paul Moser:14    
Epistemic justification is essentially related to the so-called cognitive goal 
of truth, insofar as an individual belief is epistemically justified only if it is 
appropriately directed toward the goal of truth. (Moser 1985, 4) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 For example, all of the philosophers cited above appeal to (roughly) the claim that if one knows that P, one 
can rationally rely on P in one’s practical reasoning. Mark Schroeder (2012) offers an additional rationale for 
pragmatic encroachment, arguing that even if only evidence constitutes reason to believe, pragmatic 
considerations can enter into an account of knowledge by providing reasons to suspend judgment. Neither of 
these rationales can easily be adapted to an account of the sources of basic epistemic justification. Note, 
however, that if one combined pragmatic encroachment with the view that the evidence that constitutes a 
subject’s justification for belief just is that subject’s knowledge, pragmatic encroachment on knowledge 
would also infect prima facie justification. Such a combination is not compatible with Truth-Directedness.   
14 See Berker 2013, §3 for dozens of endorsements by epistemologists of similar (often stronger) theses about 
the relationship between epistemic justification and truth. 
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This is not to say that Truth-Directedness is uncontroversial (see, prominently, Wright 
2004 on entitlement). However, the presumption of something like Truth-Directedness is 
so entrenched that it can be hard for even a radical to put it into question. For example, 
Stephen Stich reports that, when philosophers first confronted his heterodox argument that 
truth should not be the aim of our epistemic practices, many of them simply “assume[d] I 
must be joking, or propounding silly skeptical puzzles” (1990, 101).15  
 There is a powerful explanation of the strength and breadth of endorsement of 
theses similar to Truth-Directedness. As we have noted, epistemic justification appears 
both to be substantively normative and (as the example of Hallie shows) very different 
from ethical justification. Truth-Directedness promises to explain both of these features. 
On the one hand, the link to truth is distinctive: for example, there does not appear to be a 
parallel constraint on our ethical norms. 16 On the other hand, the substantiveness of 
epistemic normativity can potentially be explained in part by appeal to the intrinsic or 
instrumental significance of true belief.17  
Truth-Directedness also helps to address an important challenge that Enoch poses 
to those philosophers (such as ourselves) who want to reject his account of epistemic 
justification, but who also want to preserve the role of explanatory indispensability in 
epistemic justification. The challenge is to identify a principled distinction between those 
kinds of indispensability that can justify belief, and those that do not (2011b, 67). Truth-
Directedness provides the tools needed to accomplish this task.  
Truth-Directedness is a constraint on candidate vindicating theories, and not a 
vindicating theory itself. It is thus compatible with many different ways of seeking to 
vindicate the sources of basic epistemic justification (for example). However, we know 
what attempts to vindicate inference to the best explanation (IBE) within a truth-directed 
framework would look like. This is because the overwhelming majority of the literature on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 We take Stich’s radical challenge to be significant. We set it aside here, however, because addressing it 
would require an entirely distinct sort of argument. 
16 Compare Alston 2005: Alston abandons the idea that there is a single category of epistemic justification. 
Still, he is able to characterize various features as epistemic desiderata in large part because all of them are in 
some way or another truth-directed. 
17 One example: the central “problem of normativity” in contemporary knowledge-centric epistemology is 
arguably to explain why knowledge is relevantly better than mere true belief, given that truth is the 
fundamental normative currency of epistemology. Cf. e.g. Sosa 2007, Lecture 4.  
Deliberative indispensability and epistemic justification	   16 	  
the vindication of IBE presupposes something like Truth-Directedness. For example, Peter 
Lipton (2004, Ch. 11) and Igor Douven (2011 §3) assume without comment that a 
“justification” of IBE (i.e.: roughly, a vindication) will show that IBE is “truth-tropic” or 
reliable. And the discussion above suggests alternative accounts that appeal to epistemic 
responsibility or virtue, or to transcendental conditions on the pursuit of truth. Fully 
developing any such theory would be no small task. But that is not our goal. Our aim here 
is to explain how, with Truth-Directedness in hand, one can have confidence that 
explanatory indispensability could be vindicated as a source of basic epistemic justification, 
even if deliberative indispensability is not.  
In this subsection, we have introduced Truth-Directedness, and made what we 
take to be a strong initial case for its plausibility. To sum up: it is intuitively plausible; it is 
ecumenical among many central controversies in epistemology; and it promises to explain 
the distinctive normativity of epistemic justification. This is the first half of our case for this 
thesis. The next section completes that case, by sketching three counterexamples to 
Pragmatic, and arguing that Truth-Directedness can well-explain why these cases are 
powerful objections to Pragmatic.   
 
2.2 Three cases against Pragmatic  
Enoch’s accounts of intrinsic and instrumental indispensability are intended to be capacity-
relative (note Enoch’s judicious use of “to us” language at 2011b, 70-71). This means that, 
on Enoch’s account, the sources of epistemic justification that are basic for us may not be 
basic for a creature with quite different capacities. For example, sense perception would 
not be instrumentally indispensable to a god-like being who had direct intuitive epistemic 
access to the complete nature of reality. And so, on Enoch’s account, it would not count as 
a source of basic epistemic justification for such a being. We think that this assumption of 
capacity-relativity is essential to the plausibility of Enoch’s account: why should 
instrumental indispensability for some other sort of creature determine what we have reason to 
believe? However, this feature of the account also makes it vulnerable to our first two 
counterexamples.  
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Case One: Sparky and Sally 
Suppose that ingenious artificial intelligence researchers have designed an AI 
(“Sparky”) capable of having full-fledged beliefs about the world. Sparky is epistemically 
similar to an ordinary person (“Sally”) in the following respects: Sparky’s capacities (and 
limitations) with respect to memory and to reasoning processes that conclude in belief are 
identical to Sally’s. Further, across Sally’s whole life, Sparky has been rigged up to Sally so 
that Sparky receives exactly the sensory evidence that Sally does. We stipulate just one 
crucial difference between Sally and Sparky. Perhaps Sparky does some things that count as 
actions, but unlike Sally, Sparky is simply incapable of deliberating about what to do.18  
Plausibly, at any given time in Sally’s adult life, Sally and Sparky share (very 
nearly) the same total evidence.  After all, they have been exposed to very nearly the same 
sensory evidence. Their memories are qualitatively nearly identical. Their senses are 
similarly connected to the very same environment. And they have identical capacities and 
dispositions to form beliefs on the basis of these inputs.  
Suppose further that, in light of their parallel capacities and circumstances, Sally 
and Sparky engage in ethical reasoning (that is: reasoning about which ethical claims are true) 
in exactly the same ways at exactly the same times: when Sally trusts some testimony, so 
does Sparky; when Sally finds a thought experiment or principle intuitively compelling, so 
does Sparky, etc. So Sally and Sparky in fact accept all the same ethical propositions, on the 
same bases. For Sparky, of course, this reasoning has purely theoretical significance. In 
contrast, Sally’s ethical reasoning is often a part of her practical deliberation: she often acts 
on the basis of her ethical conclusions.  
This description makes it highly plausible that at any given time, Sally and Sparky 
are almost always justified to the same extent in believing the very same propositions.19 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 One might question whether Sparky is genuinely possible. For example, on a standard functionalist account 
of psychology, a belief is a state that, inter alia, interacts with desires in certain ways. Functionalism would 
thus take a dim view of Sparky imagined as a “pure thinker” with beliefs but no desires. However, we insist 
only that Sparky lack only the capacity for practical deliberation (as Enoch conceives of that capacity; 2011b, 
70-73). This is compatible with Sparky possessing desires, because functionalists are paradigmatically happy 
to ascribe beliefs and desires to animals that lack sophisticated deliberative capacities of the sort Enoch’s 
argument appeals to. This point, combined with the intuitive conceivability of a creature like Sparky, 
constitutes a strong case for Sparky’s genuine possibility. 
19 Or, if epistemic permissivism is true, the same range of attitudes is permissible for each of them to take 
towards a given proposition. On epistemic permissivism, see White 2005. 
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There is one plausible exception: Sally will have plenty of introspective and memory 
evidence as of deliberating, which Sparky will lack, so she (unlike Sparky) will have many 
beliefs that are justified partly on this basis. However, it is hard to imagine this affecting 
how justified each of them is in accepting an ethical or metaethical claim. On Enoch’s 
account, however, Sally has a rationally required project (practical deliberation) that 
Sparky lacks. So, Enoch’s account suggests that Sally has some defeasible epistemic 
justification for believing that there are ethical facts that Sparky lacks. This, we submit, is 
very odd.  
The force of the oddity can be illustrated by comparing our case to a more familiar 
“new evil demon” case, inspired by the initial discussion in Keith Lehrer and Stewart 
Cohen’s (1983). This case compares two agents who are “perspectival” duplicates: they 
have identical beliefs, apparent memories, and confront identical perceptual appearances. 
The difference between these agents is that the perceptual appearances which in the one 
agent arise from reliable sense perception are in the other the result of demonic illusion. 
There is strong intuitive pull to think that agents like these are also intuitively justificational 
duplicates, and that this constitutes a serious problem for reliabilist accounts of justification. 
While the case is powerful, justification “externalists” can potentially bite the bullet here, 
in part by appealing to their central arguments that causal or modal connection to the 
world are justification-conferring. Our case is more dialectically powerful than the new 
evil demon case, because it holds parallel all of the features – both “internal” and “external” 
– that contemporary epistemologists typically find relevant to epistemic justification. 
Indeed, the case is intended to isolate only the distinctive alleged source of epistemic 
justification entailed by Enoch’s account.      
However, this is exactly what makes Enoch’s account so implausible. Sally is 
supposed to have justification for believing that there are ethical facts that Sparky lacks. But 
the only difference between Sparky and Sally is that Sally engages in a valuable activity that 
Sparky cannot engage in, and that activity would not be valuable if there were no ethical 
facts. It is very hard to see how this difference could make Sally more justified than Sparky. 
Thus, we claim, the case of Sparky and Sally is a counter-example to Enoch’s theory. 
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Case Two: Declan 
Next consider Declan, an ordinary agent who has never thought about metaethics. 
He has no beliefs about whether there are ethical facts, and if he thought about it, he would 
simply suspend judgment on the matter.20 Enoch’s account predicts that Declan – like us – 
has indispensability-grounded justification for believing that there are ethical facts. Now 
imagine that an evil demon temporarily eliminates Declan’s capacity to deliberate (without 
his noticing), and does nothing else. On a straightforward reading of Enoch, Declan 
thereby has less justification for believing that there are ethical facts. But it is very odd to 
think that such a demon can alter Declan’s epistemic situation simply by switching on and 
off this capacity. By contrast, there is nothing odd about a demon altering what Declan is 
justified in believing by altering his access to uncontroversial sources of basic epistemic 
justification. For example, if the demon eliminates Declan’s ability to remember that P, 
this can undercut Declan’s justification for believing that P.       
 
Case Three: Marjorie 
Marjorie has strong empirical evidence that her practical deliberation is not 
causally efficacious. This evidence suggests that she is in a science fiction dystopia, where, 
whenever she deliberates and decides what to do, certain diabolical scientists intervene, 
and prevent her intention from guiding her action. In fact, however, Marjorie is in a 
different science fiction dystopia, where the scientists interfere with her perceptual faculties, 
memories, and sense of self-control, but leave the connection between her decisions and 
actions untouched. Now consider the following de se belief: the results of my practical 
deliberation have some chance of being causally efficacious. It may be possible to deliberate 
absent this belief. 21  However this belief is plausibly instrumentally indispensable to 
practical deliberation in Enoch’s sense: the central reasons that one has to deliberate would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Does this imply that Declan is irrational, given Enoch’s account? No. For deliberative indispensability 
provides only defeasible justification, and Declan could be in the presence of relevant defeaters. 
21 Bratman 1987, 37-8 has offered counterexamples against the idea that φ-ing intentionally requires belief 
that one can φ. For example, someone recovering from paralysis might intentionally flex her hand behind her 
back, despite not knowing whether she is doing so, or indeed whether she is able to do so. If one is compelled 
by some cases, one should also allow that such an agent could deliberate about whether to flex her hand 
behind her back.    
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surely be radically undermined by the inefficacy of one’s deliberation. This means that, on 
Enoch’s account, Marjorie has indispensability-based basic justification for believing that 
her practical deliberations are causally efficacious.  
This case exploits the fact that if deliberative indispensability provides basic 
justification for believing that there are ethical facts, it will also provide basic justification 
for believing ordinary contingent propositions. This is embarrassing for Enoch because 
beliefs like the one mentioned – which concern the distribution of contingent causal 
connections – seem paradigmatically amenable only to justification on the basis of empirical 
evidence.22 Deliberative indispensability, however, appears to be an a priori mode of 
justification. On Enoch’s account, Marjorie’s empirical evidence has to compete with and 
outweigh her alleged deliberatively-based a priori evidence that she can affect the world via 
her practical deliberations. This is implausible.23    
 
2.3 Why Enoch’s vindicating account fails  
This puts us in a position to spell out our central objection to Enoch: Truth-
Directedness is a constraint on vindicating accounts of the sources of basic epistemic 
justification, and Pragmatic violates Truth-Directedness. This is because the fact that the 
belief that P is indispensable to our deliberative projects bears no positive relationship to 
the truth of P. Indeed, Enoch never claims that it does. Rather, he appeals to a different 
normative significance for this belief: that it is indispensable to a rationally non-optional 
project. But, as we have emphasized in §2.1, it is not enough for a vindicating account of 
the sources of basic epistemic justification to be normatively significant; such an account 
must also capture what is distinctive of epistemic justification. This, we have argued, 
requires compatibility with Truth-Directedness.  
The fact that Pragmatic violates Truth-Directedness explains the force of the three 
counterexamples just offered. Consider them in turn. The difference between Sparky and 
Sally is that Sally has an indispensable project that Sparky lacks. That may give Sally all sorts 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 We thank David Enoch helping us to clarify the force of this case.  
23 It should be noted that, according to some views, there are cases of a priori justification of contingent 
claims (such as the claim I am here now). We are not convinced there are such cases. But note that even if 
there are such cases, the best explanations of their plausibility do not apply here. 
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of ethical reasons. But it is instructive to compare Sally to Hallie: the demon’s threat is 
unconnected to the truth of Hallie’s belief in her golden voice, and that explains why the 
demon’s threat does not epistemically justify. The instrumental indispensability of Sally’s 
belief in ethical facts appears unrelated to the truth of Sally’s belief in just the same way. In 
the second case: turning on and off Declan’s capacity to deliberate about what to do does 
not affect what he is justified in believing, because this capacity does not add any 
connection (causal, modal, perspectivally relative, or otherwise) to the facts that was 
lacking in its absence. The distinctive feature of the third case is that Marjorie’s relevant 
beliefs concern contingent facts about causal connections. Here, the implausibility of 
deliberative indispensability making a positive difference is well-explained by our difficulty 
in understanding how there could be a relevant positive connection between (a) the 
deliberative indispensability of beliefs concerning such facts and (b) their truth. We take 
these highly plausible theoretical explanations of the force of the intuitive cases to augment 
the force of the cases themselves.    
Further, in virtue of violating Truth-Directedness, Pragmatic offers inferior 
explanations of why some candidate sources of evidence are not basic justifiers.24 For 
example, why doesn’t reading tea leaves provide basic justification for beliefs about your 
fate? Here are two (schematic) candidate explanations: (1) the beliefs that result from 
standard methods of tea-leaf reading bear no positive relation to facts about your fate; (2) 
reliance on tea-leaf reading is not instrumentally indispensable to a rationally indispensable 
project. Both (1) and (2) seem true. (Although one can easily imagine a benighted soul 
whose fragile grasp on the shreds of meaning in his life required trust in the tea leaves). But 
(1) is intuitively a much better answer to our explanatory question than (2).    
For another example, consider a case of active controversy in foundationalist 
circles: whether testimony is a source of basic epistemic justification. Pragmatic suggests 
that this controversy could be resolved in large part by determining whether reliance on 
testimony is instrumentally indispensable to an intrinsically indispensable project. It 
plausibly is: living well with others is plausibly an intrinsically indispensable project for 
creatures like us, and defeasibly trusting their testimony seems instrumentally 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 We are indebted to Brad Cokelet for this point. 
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indispensable to that project. But this seems like the wrong sort of consideration to settle 
the outstanding debate about whether or not testimony is a source of basic epistemic 
justification.   
Finally, note that it may be possible to come up with piecemeal replies to some of 
our counterexamples. However, we think this would be a losing strategy for the defender 
of Pragmatic. With Truth-Directedness in hand, we have a recipe for generating 
counterexamples to Pragmatic: construct cases where Pragmatic endorses as epistemically 
basic methods that lack plausible connection to the truth. Such counterexamples will be 
legion.25   
One might object on Enoch’s behalf here that practical deliberation is truth-
directed. In particular, one might object that often, when we engage in practical 
deliberation, we deploy our rational capacities to answer the (purportedly) factual 
question: what ought I to do? One might then take a page from another of Enoch’s 
arguments (2011b, Ch. 7), and suggest that we have reason to believe that our capacity for 
practical deliberation is in fact acceptably reliable, because evolution has fitted us to track 
something close to the ethical facts.  
While this objection is initially seductive, it ultimately misunderstands either 
Enoch’s view or our case against it. Truth-directedness does not merely require that a 
vindicating account point to a belief-forming method that in fact bears some positive 
connection to the truth (our example of the divine command theory of epistemic 
justification in §2.1 satisfied that criterion). Rather, on our theory, a legitimate vindicating 
account must appeal to this positive connection to explain why something is a source of basic 
epistemic justification. As we have emphasized, Pragmatic simply does not do that. Because 
our argument here is directed against this explanatory theory, the question of whether the 
deliberative methods that theory endorses also happen to be in some sense positively 
connected to the truth is irrelevant.  
We conclude that Pragmatic should be rejected. We have argued that it faces 
serious intuitive counterexamples. Further, this vulnerability to counterexample is well-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 For another example that fits this recipe, see Cuneo’s case for the instrumental indispensability of having a 
positive self-image (2012, 1064).  
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explained by the fact that Pragmatic violates a powerful constraint on vindicating accounts 
of the sources of basic epistemic justification, namely: Truth-Directedness.  
The failure of Pragmatic does not by itself show that no defensible vindicating 
account can be given that would underwrite Indispensabilism. Nor does it establish our 
more ambitious thesis: that Indispensabilism must be rejected. However, our argument 
against Pragmatic does provide the materials needed in order to extend our argument to 
both of these stronger conclusions. We now turn to that task. 
 
3. Alternative vindicating accounts and Indispensabilism 
 As we saw in Section 1, there are good reasons to seek a vindication of the sources 
of basic epistemic justification. To repeat, a vindication of those basic sources is, roughly, a 
non-epistemic explanation of why the sources are what they are, which upholds (rather 
than debunks or reforms away) our intuitive conception of the nature and importance of 
those sources. In the previous section, we argued that Pragmatic – Enoch’s proposed 
vindicating account – should be rejected. In this section, we argue that there are strong 
reasons to think that our case will generalize to other attempts to vindicate 
Indispensabilism. The core reason is that deliberative indispensability appears unconnected 
to the truth. This means that those seeking to vindicate Indispensabilism face a dilemma. 
On the one hand, you can develop an account that aims to vindicate deliberative 
indispensability as a basic source of justification. But those accounts will – like Pragmatic – 
be inconsistent with Truth-Directedness, and thus, we claim, fail to provide an adequate 
account of epistemic justification. On the other hand, you can aim to provide a vindicating 
account of the sources of basic epistemic justification that is compatible with Truth-
Directedness. Such accounts have some chance of vindicating norms of epistemic 
justification. But such accounts will not vindicate deliberative indispensability as a basic 
source. If sound, the dilemma provides good reason to think that Indispensabilism is false.  
 To begin, consider an example of the second horn of the dilemma. Alvin Goldman 
(2008) has recently suggested a view that treats reliabilism as (in our terms) a vindicating 
account of the sources of basic epistemic justification. For example, this account suggests 
that sense perception is epistemically basic because, in a relevant range of cases, the 
processes that link the world to perceptual states and thence to correlated belief are on the 
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whole marvelously reliable. Such a reliabilist vindicating account of the foundations of 
epistemic justification is evidently compatible with Truth-Directedness. Indeed, reliabilism 
is one natural framework for spelling out a substantive justification-truth link. But this 
vindicating account is also hostile to Indispensabilism.26 This example will generalize: 
similar considerations apply to possible vindicating accounts that emphasize alternative 
modal properties such as sensitivity or safety, rather than process reliability (Cf. Nozick 
1981, Sosa 1999, Roush 2007).  
 The force of the tension may appear less clear as we move away from modal 
approaches to satisfying Truth-Directedness. However, consider one of the most influential 
alternatives to such conceptions, which we will call “responsibilism” about epistemic 
norms.27 On this way of thinking about epistemology, norms for epistemic justification are, 
or are grounded in, (some of the) norms that govern what is required to be a responsible 
epistemic agent (cf. Chisholm 1977, Bonjour 1985, Greco 1990). On one variant, for a 
belief to be justified is just for it to have been formed by an epistemically responsible process. 
For example, on this sort of account, if I believe that P in virtue of carefully acquiring and 
assessing the evidence, which I reasonably find to strongly support P, I would be justified in 
believing P, even if this process is in fact unreliable.28 Conversely, if I form my belief that P 
irresponsibly – e.g. on a whimsical hunch – I would not be justified, even if my whimsical 
hunches are in fact very reliable.29  
The central question for this sort of approach is how to characterize an 
epistemically responsible process. It is no accident that many responsibilists in 
epistemology (including those cited above) advert to truth in explaining what epistemic 
responsibility amounts to. Think again about Hallie: her continuing to believe that she 
sounds exactly like Steve Perry when she sings “Don’t Stop Believin’” would be highly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 One could of course here try to present an ambitious argument that deliberative indispensability is a 
reliable belief-forming method. We think that the prospects for such an argument are not good, and thus 
leave this possibility to the side for now, in order to streamline our main discussion. 
27 Another important group of approaches seeks to understand central epistemic categories like justification in 
terms of epistemically virtuous and vicious character traits (e.g. Montmarquet 1993, Zagzebski 1996, Sosa 
2007, Greco 2010). On these approaches, epistemic virtue tends itself to be understood either in modal or 
responsibilist terms (or both), leading to a very similar dialectic as in the text. Because of this, we do not 
discuss these approaches further here.  
28 Compare again the “new evil demon”-style cases.  
29 Compare Bonjour’s classic case of Norman the clairvoyant 1985, 41ff. 
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ethically responsible, but a clear violation of her “epistemic duties”, if such things exist. And 
the lack of (first-personally mediated) connection to the truth appears to be an excellent 
explanation of the latter fact. With this contrast in hand, it becomes very unclear how 
Indispensabilism could be vindicated as compatible with our fundamental epistemic duties.  
It is worth emphasizing that not all responsibilists do advert to a connection to 
truth in explaining epistemic responsibility. For example, on one natural reading of Enoch, 
he is a responsibilist. On this reading, Pragmatic reflects an underlying conception of 
epistemic responsibility as requiring apt pursuit of our intrinsically indispensable projects. 
On this reading, our core argument in this paper can be seen as illuminating the difficulties 
facing attempts to characterize epistemic responsibility in a way that is inconsistent with 
Truth-Directedness. 
These brief remarks demonstrate the challenges facing attempts to defend 
Indispensabilism by providing a vindication of the sources of basic epistemic justification. 
The pattern suggested by these cases makes it plausible that any vindicating account for the 
sources of basic epistemic justification will either fail to respect the Truth-Directedness 
constraint (and thus, we claim, fail to secure a link to genuine epistemic justification), or fail 
to support Indispensabilism.  
Enoch’s thesis that our intuitive commitments in practical deliberation are a basic 
source of evidence is highly controversial among foundationalists (contrast sources like 
sense perception, memory, and use of IBE). So if this source is going to get on to the list, it 
needs to do so on theoretical grounds (Enoch’s defense of Pragmatic is one such theoretical 
attempt). However, if we are right, Truth-Directedness is one of our central theoretical 
commitments concerning epistemic justification. This suggests that any theoretical attempt 
to vindicate Indispensabilism will need to involve quite radical reform of our understanding 
of epistemology. For example, one could reject Truth-Directedness as part of a broader 
meta-philosophical pragmatism. We think that our case for Truth-Directedness tells against 
such views. However, the dialectic here is notoriously murky, with very little that can be 
assumed as non-question-begging common ground. We are thus satisfied to say: 
Indispensabilism must be rejected, modulo radical forms of meta-philosophical pragmatism.   
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4. Abandoning Indispensabilism. 
In this section, we briefly discuss three distinctive replies to our argument. These 
replies each target a central assumption of our argument: that deliberative indispensability 
arguments must focus on practical deliberation; that practical deliberation does not ground 
the ethical facts; and that indispensability arguments must deliver epistemic normativity. 
Exploring these replies helpfully illuminates the range of assumptions within which our 
argument operates. These replies are also instructive because each reply abandons 
Indispensabilism in some way, in order to defend a related thesis.   
First, one might hope that the metaethical payoff of Enoch’s project could be 
preserved, and our objection avoided, by the following variant on his argument. Begin by 
claiming that indispensability to the epistemic (or doxastic, or explanatory) project confers 
basic epistemic justification. Assume that the epistemic project is consistent with Truth-
Directedness. (Whether it is depends on how one characterizes this project.) Then adapt 
Enoch’s case for the deliberative indispensability of belief in Robustly Real ethical facts, into 
a case for the indispensability of belief in Robustly Real epistemic facts for doxastic 
deliberation. This would permit a Truth-Directedness-respecting case for Robust Realism 
about the epistemic facts. The Robust Realist about ethical facts can now appeal to the 
epistemic as a companion in guilt: once we posit some normative facts (conceived of along 
the lines of Robust Realism), it might seem a small cost to take on commitment to 
additional normative facts, such as the ethical facts.30 
Note that this argument abandons Indispensabilism. It grants Truth-Directedness, 
and seeks to find a variant of Enoch’s argument that is compatible with the central points 
that we have made in this paper. This argument is thus substantially less theoretically 
exciting that Enoch’s. However, if it succeeded in defending Robust Realism about ethical 
facts, it would deserve substantial independent attention. 
We doubt it succeeds, however, for at least two reasons. First, note that 
deliberation about what to believe is, famously, transparent: we focus on whether P, not 
whether we ought to believe that P. In light of this, it is not clear that belief in epistemic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 See Cuneo 2007 for an extended case that many of the core challenges posed to positing ethical facts carry 
over to positing epistemic ones. 
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facts is indispensable to such deliberation, as the adapted argument requires. If the oracle 
tells you there are no epistemic facts, the project of settling what to believe still evidently 
has a central and valuable point. Second, if the companion in guilt is established, it might 
assuage worries about belief in Robustly Real ethical facts that stem from the alleged 
metaphysical peculiarity of those facts. However, it is not clear that it helps with the 
central challenge of this paper.  To see this, consider that the proposal says nothing about 
whether the justification of belief in ethical facts is consistent with Truth-Directedness. 
Here the proponent of this strategy faces a dilemma. If she claims that the justification of 
belief in ethical facts is inconsistent with Truth-Directedness, then our main argument in 
this paper targets her position in the same way that it targets Enoch’s. And if she claims that 
the justification of belief in ethical facts is consistent with Truth-Directedness, then her 
view is radically different from Enoch’s, such that the central challenges that Enoch’s 
account were meant to address will need to be addressed entirely anew.  
A second important strategy for replying to our argument appeals to an ambitious 
form of constructivism about ethical facts. Suppose, for example, that ethical facts are 
determined by a certain privileged (and indispensable) process of practical deliberation. 
This could be used to deliver an account of our epistemic justification for belief in ethical 
facts that is entirely consistent with Truth-Directedness. The basic idea here is that the very 
process of practical deliberation that commits us to the existence of ethical facts also 
functions to ground the existence of those facts. If this were the explanation for why this 
commitment constituted a source of basic epistemic justification, it satisfies Truth-
Directedness.  
This is a familiar attempt to make good on the Tempting Idea we mentioned in the 
Introduction. The challenges facing this view are equally familiar. Enoch himself has 
forcefully posed some of these challenges in his (2006 and 2011a). We cannot hope to 
assess this strategy here, but we do want to emphasize that this kind of constructivism 
about ethical facts does not underwrite Indispensabilism. This kind of constructivism 
supports a domain-specific claim about the metaphysics of ethics, rather than a global 
epistemic thesis about the significance of deliberative indispensability (which is what 
Indispensabilism is). Perhaps this suggested constructivist view – which is only about 
ethical facts in particular – is all that we should have wanted from the Tempting Idea to 
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start with. If so, this brings out the poor fit between Indispensabilism and the intuitive idea 
it was supposed to underwrite.31   
Finally, a third reply to our argument is to give up on the idea that deliberative 
indispensability gives us distinctively epistemic justification. Developed in this way, the 
Tempting Idea would be wholly compatible with the naturalistic criterion that we initially 
posed as its foil. For, on that criterion, we are epistemically justified in believing in ethical 
facts just in case they (or their reduction base) feature in our best explanations of 
scientifically respectable phenomena. Despite this compatibility, the third reply also comes 
at a certain cost. It would be interesting, for example, if we were ethically committed to 
the existence of Robustly Real ethical facts. But if this provides us with no evidence for 
their existence, the upshot could be a deep and potentially intractable conflict between the 
demands of practical and epistemic reason. This is an interesting possibility, but not a 
particularly attractive one.  
  Summing up, we think that each response that we have considered here faces 
significant challenges, and we are not hopeful about any of them. Thus, although our main 
argument in this paper is directed at Indispensabilism, we take our argument to have 
another upshot as well: it helps clarify the range of ways that one might seek to make good 
on the Tempting Idea that we started with, and underscores the significant philosophical 
burdens that one takes on in trying to do so.  
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Notice that some philosophers drawn to the Tempting Idea have appealed to a similar idea with respect to a 
range of types of facts, such as facts about the nature of action, the self, or desire (e.g. Korsgaard 2009, 
Schapiro 2009). Suppose that certain beliefs about some such facts were practically indispensable. 
Indispensabilism would then underwrite an inference from that indispensability to epistemic justification. 
Attempting to replace Indispensabilism with a “constructivist” rationale, however, requires finding an 
independent metaphysical argument that shows that the relevant facts are grounded in facts about some 
practical project (e.g., the project of practical deliberation). Such grounding claims will not be equally 
plausible for all types of facts. The crucial point about this alternative to Indispensabilism is that the 
defensibility of indispensability arguments for epistemically justified belief in a class of facts will stand or fall 
with the plausibility of a “constructivist” metaphysics for that class of facts.  
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5. Conclusion 
 This paper has evaluated the prospects of the following thesis:  
Indispensabilism  If a belief-forming method is indispensable to the 
project of practical deliberation, then that method is a 
source of basic epistemic justification 
One striking reason to be drawn to this thesis is that our commitment to the existence of 
ethical facts can seem to arise from their apparent deliberative indispensability, rather than 
from any role that they play in explaining scientifically respectable phenomena. A modest 
methodological conservatism enjoins us to try to uphold this etiology as justification-
conferring. This is a scrupulously reasonable project. However, we have argued that it 
likely cannot be successfully accomplished.  
 The heart of our argument has been that in order to vindicate the epistemic 
credentials of Indispensabilism, one would need to show that it is compatible with what is 
distinctive of epistemic justification. We explored Enoch’s sophisticated recent attempt to 
vindicate Indispensabilism, and argued that it falls well short. Our argument rested heavily 
on a characterization of (part of what) makes epistemic justification distinctive. According 
to this thesis, which we dubbed Truth-Directedness, the explanation of what makes 
something a source of basic epistemic justification must advert to a connection between 
that source and the truth of the proposition justified. This thesis attempts to bring out a 
fundamental difference between the norms of epistemic justification and those of practical 
justification, suggested at the start of the paper by our example of Hallie and the demon. 
We argued that Enoch’s defense of Indispensabilism violated Truth-Directedness. We then 
argued that Enoch’s failure to successfully defend Indispensabilism is no accident: we have 
reason to be confident that similar challenges will plague other attempts to defend 
Indispensabilism. Finally, we discussed ways of attempting to appeal to deliberative 
indispensability in metaethics that abandon Indispensabilism.  
Both Indispensabilism and Truth-Directedness share a substantive foundationalist 
assumption about epistemic structure. This is a significant limitation of our argument as 
developed here, because one can easily imagine theses similar to Indispensabilism that 
eschew the foundationalist assumption. We conjecture that variants of Truth-Directedness 
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could be used to raise very similar problems for these theses. However, we do not have the 
space to defend this claim here.  
  We would like to close by briefly underscoring some of the broader metaethical 
import our argument. First, consider the significance of this conclusion for the assessment 
of Robust Realism in metaethics. Enoch’s deliberative indispensability argument is crucial 
to his case for Robust Realism. So, if this argument fails, one of the most interesting and 
innovative defenses of Robust Realism simply stops well short of the finish line. Beyond its 
central role in his positive case, the argument from deliberative indispensability plays two 
other major roles in Enoch’s defense of Robust Realism. First, he uses the argument to 
defend Robust Realism against a common naturalist objection to non-naturalist metaethical 
views: given that (according to the relevant kind of non-naturalist) these ethical facts (or 
their reduction base) are not part of our best explanation of any scientifically respectable 
phenomena, we lack epistemic justification for believing in them.32 Second, Enoch also uses 
the argument to explain how we can have epistemic justification for belief in Robustly Real 
ethical facts without recourse to anything akin to a special perceptual faculty for learning 
about these facts – something that many have worried non-naturalists will be forced to 
posit. Without his argument from deliberative indispensability to turn to, Enoch’s 
innovative responses to these challenges to Robust Realism are undercut. This leaves the 
Robust Realist about ethical facts still searching for solutions to these challenges.   
 Our assessment of Indispensabilism has metaethical significance that extends 
beyond the evaluation of Robust Realism. Many philosophers – including philosophers who 
advocate metaethical positions quite different from Robust Realism – have been attracted 
to some version of the Tempting Idea that we introduced at the start of this paper. To 
repeat, this was the idea that the (putative) indispensability of belief in ethical facts for our 
practical projects – including, for example, the project of deliberating about what to do – 
can somehow justify our belief in such facts. If our argument in this paper is right, then one 
of the clearest ways of making good on this idea, namely, Indispensabilism, should be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 It is important to note that Enoch’s strategy is intended as an alternative to two common replies to this 
objection. The first is to insist that ethical facts in fact do play a role in the explanation of scientifically 
respectable phenomena. The second is that ethical facts themselves count as respectable explananda (even if 
not necessarily scientifically respectable). Enoch 2011b, 53 expresses skepticism about both of these replies. 
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rejected. Moreover, as we discussed in §4, there are serious worries with some of the 
other salient ways that one might seek to make good on the Tempting Idea, e.g. by giving 
up on the idea that the sort of justification involved is genuinely epistemic justification, or by 
pursuing an ambitious constructivism about ethical facts.  
To sum up, then, we have argued for three conclusions concerning the epistemic 
and metaethical significance of practical indispensability. First, we should reject Enoch’s 
indispensabilist case for Robust Realism about ethical facts. Second, we should reject 
Indispensabilism in general: deliberative indispensability does not epistemically justify 
belief. Third, there are good reasons to be skeptical of the metaethical significance of 
deliberative indispensability, as well as practical indispensability more broadly. 
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